Élan and ruthlessness characterized World War II’s best light infantry force.
Imperial Japanese Army infantrymen of World War II were something of a para- dox. Their unequaled fighting spirit, ability to adapt to widely varied climates and terrain, capacity to endure incredible hardships, and willingness to launch attacks against overwhelming odds and fight to the death rather than surrender made them the war’s best light infantry force. Yet their routinely brutal treatment of both enemy prisoners of war and the civilian population of occupied territories earned them a reputation for pitiless ruthlessness seldom matched in 20th-century armies. At least part of this can be explained by their rigidly enforced adherence to Bushido (the uncompromising warrior code) and the harshly administered discipline (including corporal punishment) they endured on a daily basis.
From 1937 until early 1943, Japanese infantrymen proved nearly unstoppable as they launched lightning campaigns against Chinese, British, Commonwealth and American forces. They spearheaded Japan’s conquest of huge areas of China, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Their battlefield accomplishments seem even more remarkable given the generally inferior quality of their weaponry – unwieldy bolt-action rifles, substandard machine guns and unreliable hand grenades. Despite this handicap, and the fact that their artillery support was often woefully inadequate compared to that of their opponents, attacking Japanese infantrymen won some stunning victories. One of the most notable was their early 1942 conquest of Malaya and Singapore when 70,000 Japanese soldiers defeated British and Commonwealth troops who outnumbered them 2-to-1.
Although Japan’s offensive operations continued in China and Burma until late 1944-early 1945, its Pacific area operations were defensive after the American-inflicted defeats at New Guinea (January 1943) and Guadalcanal (February 1943). From early 1943 until the end of the Pacific War, Japanese army infantrymen were as formidable on the defense as they had been on the attack during their opening war offensives. Fighting from dugin, fortified positions, they (and Imperial Japanese Navy Special Naval Landing Force troops) exacted a heavy toll on invading U.S. Marines and Soldiers, typically fighting to the death.
American troops rightly feared Japanese infantrymen’s terrifying “banzai” charges. Yet after the largest such attack of the Pacific War (4,500 Japanese infantry and sailors, Saipan, July 7, 1944), Japanese commanders adopted defensive tactics that proved even more deadly to their opponents, notably at Iwo Jima (February-March 1945) and Okinawa (April-June 1945). Rather than launching suicidal “banzai” charges, Japanese defenders remained in underground tunnels and bunkers (which were generally impervious to air, artillery and naval bombardment) that the Americans were forced to clear, one by one, at an appallingly high cost in casualties.
Jerry D. Morelock, PhD, “Armchair General” Editor in Chief
Originally published in the November 2013 issue of Armchair General.
